Re-defining charity for the 21st century by Luxton, Peter
9Amicus Curiae Issue 52 March/April 2004
A
rticle
To those unacquainted with the law of charity, it maybe surprising to learn that the meaning of charity inEnglish law depends on the wording of a statute
enacted in the reign of Elizabeth I, namely the so-called
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, more commonly simply
referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth. The statute was
designed to remedy breaches of charitable trusts by
providing for a system of Commissioners to go round the
country investigating abuses. The body of the Act itself is
of purely historical interest, since it was repealed in the
latter part of the nineteenth century long after the system
that it introduced had fallen into disuse; but its Preamble
(although no longer on the statute book) remains
important because it set out a list of purposes that were
regarded as charitable at the time of the first Elizabeth, and
these purposes still forms the basis for the meaning of
charity in English law.
The courts have for centuries held that, for a purpose to
be charitable, it must either be listed in the Preamble, or
fall within what has been called “the spirit of the
Preamble”. A purpose is said to fall within the spirit of the
Preamble if the courts have declared a purpose to be
charitable by analogy with a purpose set out in the
Preamble. Later analogies can be drawn from such
analogous cases as well as from the Preamble directly. Over
the centuries therefore, the meaning of charity has
broadened as analogies are built upon analogies.
Put into modern English, the Preamble lists the
following purposes:
“The relief of aged, impotent and poor people; the
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners,
schools of learning, free schools and scholars in universities;
the repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-
banks and highways; the education and preferment of
orphans; the relief, stock or maintenance of houses of
correction; the marriages of poor maids, the supportation, aid
and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons
decayed; the relief or redemption or prisoners or captives; and
the aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payment of
fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes.”
Some of these purposes are undoubtedly archaic.
Nevertheless, it is also striking how the purposes in the
Preamble contain notions of charity that remain important
today. Although the popular meaning of charity has perhaps
widened, it might be safely maintained that the concern
with the relief of the aged, the poor and the infirm - the
first purposes listed in the Preamble - still lies at the core
of what might be popularly considered charitable. Other
specific purposes in the Preamble echo this broader theme:
“the marriages of poor maids”; “the aid or ease of any poor
inhabitants” in the payment of their taxes. Apart from the
relief of poverty, the Preamble lists of other purposes that
seem to be concerned with what might be called public
works (“the repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, sea-banks and highways”), upholding the law
(“maintenance of houses of correction”), and civil defence
(the “setting out of soldiers”, also echoed in “the
maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners”).
Near the end of the nineteenth century, in a well-known
decision of the House of Lords, Special Comrs of Income Tax v
Pemsel [1891] AC 531, Lord Macnaghten suggested a
simpler four-fold classification of charitable purposes:
(1) the relief of poverty;
(2) the advancement of education;
(3) the advancement of religion; and
(4) other purposes beneficial to the community.
The relief of poverty and the advancement of education
both feature in the Preamble; but if we look in the
Preamble for any direct reference to the advancement of
religion, we look in vain. The nearest approach seems to be
“the repair of churches”, but this particular purpose seems
designed, not to advance religion as such, but to reduce the
burden on the parishioners, who would otherwise have
been under a duty to contribute to such repairs themselves.
Elizabeth’s reign followed a period of religious turmoil in
which it was dangerous to profess an adherence to
Protestantism (when Mary was on the throne) or (at other
periods) to the Church of Rome. In any event, it soon
became clear, later in the seventeenth century, that the
advancement of religion was a charitable purpose within
the spirit of the Preamble.
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The fourth head of Pemsel is more problematic: it seems
to be an attempt to group the other purposes listed in the
Preamble, and purposes held charitable by analogy, under
some broad category of “public benefit.” It is quite clear,
therefore, that the fourth head, unlike the first three, does
not identify any particular category of charity: rather it is a
portmanteau, within which are to go all purposes which,
not falling under the first three heads, all share the
common characteristic of being beneficial to the
community – although later cases have made it clear that
merely being beneficial to the community is not itself
enough: to come within the fourth head, the purpose must
still fall within the letter or the spirit of the Preamble. The
fourth head therefore contains different lines of cases
illustrative of distinct purposes: these include purposes as
diverse as the relief of the aged; the promotion of public
health; the undertaking of public works; the protection of
human life and property; the promotion of agriculture,
industry, and commerce; the promotion of the arts; the
relief of unemployment; the care of animals; and the moral
or spiritual welfare of mankind.
THE STRATEGY UNIT PROPOSALS
A reform of the meaning of charity in English law is,
however, imminent. In September 2002, the Strategy Unit
within the Cabinet Office put forward proposals for
widespread changes to the law of charity, including the
enactment of a statutory definition. It expressed the view
that the present meaning of charity is confusing and
unclear, and that the four heads of Pemsel’s case do not
accurately represent the full range of organisations that
have, or should have, charitable status today. It
recommended instead a statutory list of 10 charitable
purposes. The first three purposes on the list would be
essentially the existing first three heads of Pemsel’s case,
although the first category is modified to include the
prevention of poverty; six new purposes would be added
(categories four to nine) and the existing final head of
Pemsel (other purposes beneficial to the community) would
complete the list as category ten.
The statutory list recommended by the Strategy Unit
was therefore:
(1) the prevention and relief of poverty;
(2) the advancement of education;
(3) the advancement of religion;
(4) the advancement of health;
(5) social and community advancement (including the care,
support and protection of aged persons with a disability,
children and young people);
(6) the advancement of culture, arts and heritage;
(7) the advancement of amateur sport;
(8) the promotion of human rights, conflict resolution and
reconciliation;
(9) the advancement of environmental protection and
improvement;
(10) other purposes beneficial to the community.
The extension of the first head of Pemsel to include the
prevention of poverty was recommended in 1976 in the
report of the Goodman Committee, Charity Law and Voluntary
Organisations, paras 58–59 and Appendix I; but what precisely
it would encompass is uncertain. Generally, however, the
enactment of the proposed list would not in itself result in
any great change in the law, as most of the additional purposes
are already regarded as charitable, either by the courts or
by the Charity Commissioners, under one or more of the
existing heads of Pemsel’s case. Decisions of the courts have
held that the advancement of health is charitable under the
fourth head of Pemsel; and the advancement of culture, arts
and heritage would currently be treated as charitable either
under the fourth head, or under the second head, the
advancement of education. The Charity Commissioners
have in recent years come to treat the protection and
improvement of the environment as charitable under the
fourth head; and although the promotion of sport is not
charitable in itself, the Commissioners currently recognise
that the promotion of healthy sports can usually be
charitable under the fourth head or (if in relation to the
young) within the second head of the advancement of
education. The enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998
has also resulted in the Commissioners’ accepting that the
promotion of human rights in the United Kingdom can
now be regarded as a charitable purpose.
Some purposes currently regarded as charitable were
notable from their omission from the Strategy Unit list.
The protection of animals, for instance, was not
mentioned, and some animal charities objected to this.
Even without a separate category, existing animal charities
would not have lost their charitable status, since the
protection and welfare of animals would have continued to
be charitable under the final category, other purposes
beneficial to the community. In its response to the Strategy
Unit proposals, the Government has accepted the
introduction of the statutory list, but has decided that the
promotion of animal welfare should have its own separate
category, as should the provision of social housing: Charities
and Not-for-Profits: A Modern Legal Framework, Home Office,
July 2003. The advancement of science would also be
added to the proposed purpose for the advancement of
culture, arts and heritage. The Government’s proposal is
therefore for a list of 12 (and not 10) separately numbered
purposes. It is also evident from the Government’s
response that the statutory list is merely picking out some
existing sub-categories of the fourth head and making
them substantive categories in their own right. The
rationale is expressed to be that “the specific purposes
contained in the list should reflect major areas of charitable
endeavour which have, or should have, strong public
recognition”: ibid, para 3.15. Nevertheless, the list remains
somewhat arbitrary, and the suggested categories are not of10
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equal significance: whilst the advancement of amateur
sport might in some circumstances be deserving of
charitable status, it is hardly to be compared in breadth and
importance with, say, the relief of poverty.
Whether there is advantage in putting charitable
purposes into the proposed statutory form is also
debatable. The proposal is essentially a statutory
enactment of Pemsel with additional categories. An
argument against putting Pemsel onto the statute book is
that it endorses the view of charity underlying Lord
Macnaghten’s classification. The Elizabethan concept of
charity might be considered to comprise two distinct
strands: public utility (exemplified in the repair of bridges
and the like) where the community benefited as a whole,
and the relief of poverty. It might be argued that where the
purposes in the Preamble involved the conferring of
benefits on individuals, this was implicitly a means of
relieving the recipients’ lack of means. The Preamble
speaks, for instance, of “free” schools, and the marriages of
“poor” maids; it might also be inferred that the young
tradesmen were too impoverished to set up in trade
without charitable assistance. On this interpretation, Pemsel
confirmed the development of charity law away from the
Elizabethan concept, with the result that the relief of
poverty, instead of running through this second strand of
charity, was restricted to a separate head, thus divorcing the
advancement of education, for example, from any idea of
relieving the needy. Interestingly, this uncertainly reaches
into the modern law. Cases have held that the phrase in the
Preamble “the relief of aged, impotent and poor people” is
to be read disjunctively; so that provision for the elderly
does not have to be for the elderly poor. But does that
mean that fees can be charged which would have the effect
of excluding the elderly poor? This issue was addressed in
a case involving the Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust
Housing Association Ltd in the 1980s, in which it was held
that the elderly persons do not have to be poor, but they
must have a need that is being relieved (in that case,
housing). The difference between “need” and the “needy”
is a subtle but important one.
PUBLIC BENEFIT
There is, however, a sting in the tail. Under the existing
law, it is not enough for a purpose to be charitable that it
falls within the letter or the spirit of the Preamble. The
purpose must also be for the public benefit. The
requirement of public benefit is self-evident in the fourth
head, since it is built into the definition of that head (other
purposes beneficial to the community). If, therefore, it is
sought to bring a new purpose into the charitable sphere
under the fourth head, it must be shown positively that that
purpose is for the public benefit. It is different in the first
three heads of Pemsel, since it is to be presumed that the
relief of poverty, the advancement of education, and the
advancement of religion, are for the public benefit. What
the Strategy Unit proposes is to strengthen the
requirement for public benefit so that the same
requirement of proof would be required under every
category of charity as is currently required only under the
fourth head. This proposal is evidently based on proposals
which were put forward a year earlier by the National
Council for Voluntary Organisations, (the NCVO) in its
report entitled For the Public Benefit. The Government has
now endorsed this proposal.
It seems, then, that although the statutory list is
innocuous enough, the real potential for altering the
meaning of charity in English law is to come through a
modified application of the public benefit test. This is
probably the most controversial part of the proposed
changes to charity law. The difficulty with it is that,
although the phrase “public benefit” is used in two
different ways in the case law concerning charities, the
Strategy Unit report evidently uses it in a third way. In the
case law, public benefit can mean either:
(a) that the purpose itself must promote public benefit;
or
(b) that the section of the community capable of benefiting
must be sufficient.
Let us consider sense (a) first. A trust for the
advancement of education is charitable for the public
benefit, since education itself is for the public benefit. If
the Strategy Unit intended to refer to public benefit in this
sense, what change would there be in requiring that public
benefit be positively proven? Would the courts or the
Charity Commissioners have to receive positive evidence
that the advancement of education is for the public
benefit? That it is surely self-evident. Would it mean
instead that positive evidence would have to be brought to
show that a particular purpose does in fact advance
education? This would give sense to the proposal, but it
would not involve any change in the law. Whilst the
advancement of education is charitable in the abstract,
there might still be doubts about whether a particular
purpose that has been proposed is in fact for the
advancement of education. In a well-known case, Re
Hummeltenberg [1923] 1 Ch 237, Russell J said that, no
matter under which of the four classes a gift may prima
facie fall, it is still necessary (in order to establish that it is
charitable in the legal sense) to show that the gift will or
may be operative for the public benefit; otherwise “trusts
might be established in perpetuity for the promotion of all
kinds of fantastic (though not unlawful) objects, of which
the training of poodles to dance might be a mild example.”
In another notable case, Re Pinion [1965] Ch 85, a testator
left his studio and its contents upon trust as a museum for
the public. Harman LJ said that it was not charitable: he
could “conceive of no useful object to be served in foisting
upon the public this mass of junk. It has neither public
utility nor educative value.”
Viewed in this light, it is clear that there is not the
difference between the first three heads of Pemsel and the 11
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fourth that the Strategy Unit and the NCVO report claim
there to be. The fourth head, as mentioned earlier, is really
a portmanteau that contains a number of specific purposes
that are considered to fall within it. For a new purpose to
come within this fourth head, it must be shown to be for
the public benefit. But once a purpose has been admitted
into that head, it is presumed that such purpose is for the
public benefit. In a later case involving that purpose, the
courts or the Commissioners do not have to decide this
abstract question again, although they might (in a
borderline case) have to determine if the particular
purpose in fact falls within that abstract purpose. A recent
example is in regard to faith healing, which is accepted as
a charitable purpose in the third head (if it involves the
advancement of religion) and within the fourth head (if it
is secular): Re Le Cren Clarke [1996] 1 WLR 288. In a future
case involving secular faith healing, the courts will have to
decide only whether what is specifically proposed in fact
falls within the concept of faith healing. This is in principle
no different, however, from the process of determining (as
in Re Shaw [1957] 1 WLR 729) whether research into the
development of a phonetic alphabet falls within the second
head, the advancement of education.
The Government makes the point in its response to the
Strategy Unit proposals that the presumption of public
benefit in the first three heads “has in any case been of
limited benefit to charities, since the Charity Commission,
at the point of registration, examines the public benefit
credentials of all applicants, without distinction between
those pursuing purposes said to enjoy the presumption and
those pursuing other purposes.” (Charities and Not-for Profits:
A Modern Legal Framework, para 3.18). Yet this observation
hardly supports the Government’s view of the law: on the
contrary, it shows that the presumption of public benefit
operates only at the level of the abstract purpose, and that
whether the particular object proposed in fact falls within
one of the recognised categories of charity does still have to
be proved in all heads of Pemsel.
Turning to sense (b), that the section of the community
capable of benefiting must be sufficient, the requirement of
public benefit varies from one head of Pemsel to another. In
the first head, the relief of poverty, it is virtually non-
existent (so that it is charitable to set up a trust for one’s
poor relations, or for poor employees of a company one
owns). In the second head, the advancement of education,
it is quite strict: thus a trust to educate the descendants of
a named person is not charitable. Even without going
further into the intricacies of public benefit in this second
sense, it will be clear that the Strategy Unit cannot be using
the expression in this sense when it talks of tightening the
public benefit requirement.
PUBLIC CHARACTER?
It would therefore seem that the Strategy Unit report is
using the expression public benefit in a different sense
from either (a) or (b). It is evident that the report’s
concern is that some existing charities are charging fees at
a level that is perceived to be excluding a significant section
of the population. The prime candidates here are the
public and independent schools, and private (fee-paying)
hospitals. The Charity Commissioners currently take the
view that fee charging that excludes a substantial
proportion of the beneficiary class does not satisfy the
public benefit criterion. This is what they state in their
publication, The Public Character of Charities. It seems that the
proposed change in the law is intended to give a firmer
legal basis for the Commissioners’ views; for it is difficult
to find clear support for them in the case law. It has been
stated judicially that a trust cannot be charitable if it in
terms excludes the poor, so that a rest home for aged
millionaires would not rank as a charity. This, however, is
not the same thing as saying that a trust cannot be
charitable merely because the effect of charging fees is
(self-evidently) to exclude those who cannot afford them.
If these proposals are to have the effect intended, it
would seem that there is a need for those drafting the
proposed legislation to put the new extended notion of
public benefit into a clear statutory form; yet the
Government has accepted the Strategy Unit
recommendation against the introduction of a statutory
definition of public benefit. Without a statutory definition,
it will be difficult to determine precisely what the province
of public benefit is meant to be. It is evidently not intended
that charities should be prohibited from charging fees; but
where is the line to be drawn? Fees are charged by many
charities, including nursing homes and elderly persons’
homes, private hospitals, theatrical trusts, museums,
independent schools, and universities. Should providers of
the City Legal Practice Course be concerned? It seems that
the Government has the independent schools in its sights,
but prefers not to pick them out in the intended
legislation. Yet whether independent schools (or private
hospitals) should continue to enjoy charitable status (and
the tax reliefs that go with it) is essentially a political issue,
and any attempt to remove such status calls for very clear
and specific legislation. It is not acceptable to attempt to
treat this issue in a purportedly non-political way simply by
trying to put a spin on the accepted legal meaning of public
benefit.
The Strategy Unit report states that, if its proposals were
enacted, “the Charity Commissioners would identify
charities likely to charge high fees and undertake a rolling
programme to check that provision was made for wider
access.” Whether this would mean some independent
schools having to provide more free places or bursaries, or
whether wider access might merely mean allowing local
schools to use the playing fields in the vacations or at week-
ends, is not clear. It might nevertheless be inferred that the
proposed tightening of public benefit is not really directed
to removing charitable status, but is more related to the
way charities operate, and this is now made plain in the
Government’s response: Charities and Not-for-Profits: A12
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Modern Legal Framework, para 3.27. If this is the policy
underlying the proposals, it is easier to appreciate why the
Government might paradoxically prefer the uncertainty of
an amorphous concept of public benefit: with no clear legal
principle laid down, institutions under scrutiny might find
it easier to resign themselves to toe the Commissioners’
line rather than to risk the expense and uncertainties of
litigation. The Government’s approach, furthermore,
confuses charitable status (which depends on an
institution’s purposes or objects) and the manner in which
a charity is run. A charitable institution’s purposes do not
cease to be charitable (and so its assets are not made
applicable to other similar charitable purposes under
section 13 of the Charities Act 1993) merely because the
trustees act wrongfully in carrying out their duties.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENT?
If the Government’s slightly modified version of the
Strategy Unit proposals are enacted as they stand, the real
development of charity law in the twenty-first century
(subject to piecemeal additions or modifications to the
statutory list) will continue to be in the final head, other
purposes beneficial to the community. This last category
will not, however, be a blank canvas. The Strategy Unit
recognises that any attempt to repeal the existing case law
would lead to excessive uncertainty; therefore the form of
words used, repeating that of Pemsel’s final head, will ensure
that the development of the final category will continue to
be based on the existing case law. Moreover, since the case
law is itself based on the Preamble, it is in the case law that
the Preamble will continue to survive.
• This article is based on a lecture given at the Institute
of Advanced Legal Studies on 12 May 2003.
Retirement of Professor Barry
Rider
Professor Barry Rider has relinquished the Directorship
of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies and taken early
retirement with effect from 31 March 2004. He has been
Director since September 1995, but has been unwell since
September last year. Sir Graeme Davies, Vice-Chancellor of
the University of London, paid tribute to Professor Rider
in the following statement:
“During his term of office, Barry Rider has developed
many new international programmes and relations for the
Institute in the areas of financial services law, corporate
law, comparative law and criminal justice. He has
significantly increased the Institute’s publications and
established a number of new journals. Professor Rider has
also played a significant role in establishing a number of
important research programmes often in collaboration
with governmental and other academic institutions. He has
also contributed a great deal to fostering the Institute’s
teaching role and, in particular, the supervision of research
degrees of the University of London. All this has enhanced
the international reputation of the Institute and its
research profile.
His creation of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies
and its highly successful journal, Amicus Curiae, has had the
effect of consolidating and increasing interest in and
support for the Institute. He has taken the concept and
design of the new Institute building a considerable way
towards realisation. In the School of Advanced Study he
has been an active member of the Directorate, and has
played a key role in his chairmanship of the Academic
Policy and Standards Committee.
Professor Rider has been accorded the title of Honorary
Senior Research Fellow in the Institute and will continue
to carry out his commitments in supervising his existing
research students”.
Jules Winterton, IALS Librarian, has been appointed
acting Director, and the Dean of the School of Advanced
Study and the Vice Chancellor have expressed their
confidence that the Institute is in safe hands. The full-time
post of Director of the Institute will be advertised shortly,
and a notice will be posted on the IALS website.
Sir Graeme Davies visits the
Institute
The recently appointed Vice-Chancellor of London
University, Sir Graeme Davies, accepted an invitation by
the Institute to visit Charles Clore House on 30 March and
acquaint himself with the work of the IALS. He was
welcomed by acting Director Jules Winterton, Professor
Avrom Sherr and Administrative Secretary David Phillips,
and given a series of presentations by staff. These included
a demonstration by Senior Librarian Steve Whittle of the
SOSIG, FLAG and BAILLI e-projects; information from
Senior Librarians David Gee and Mark Hayward on
distance services to lawyers; an explanation of the work of
the Society for Advanced Legal Studies and the role of
publications by Julian Harris, the Secretary of SALS; and
an exhibition of IALS publications in the council chamber.
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